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In Book X of the Republic, Plato takes a firmly belittling attitute toward 
painting, holding it to be an imitative craft. In light of the goals, qualitites, 
and powers often attributed to painting, Plato's view on painting seems 
wrong and cannot but provoke a response in defense of painting. In 
challenging Plato's view of painting, the following will be done: Plato's 
position on painting and the reasons he gives for it will be stated; some of 
the oversights in Plato's view will be noted; R.G. Collingwood's critique of 
Plato's view of painting as an imitative craft having deleterious effects on 
the soul will be summarized; Kandinsky's theory of painting will be 
summarized in order to show that the idea of the spiritual in painting can 
be compatible with Plato's basic tenets concerning the nature of truth; 
attention will be given to some of the goals and accomplishments o f 
ancient Creek artists which seem in keeping with Plato's values, thereby 
contradicting Plato's seeming view of the limits inherent to painting; and 
finally, Plato's views will be looked at briefly in terms of their historical 
context in an effort to shed some charitable light on why Plato held the 
views of painting that he did, and to suggest that he might not have really 
believed the hard-line view on painting that he indicates in the Republic.1 
In the Republic, Plato excoriates painting for what he sees as its 
negative relation to truth and the soul based upon what he thinks painting 
is and does. Basically, Plato thinks painting is merely imitative of physical 
appearance, is thereby removed from an understanding of the workings of 
the objects it depicts, and is thereby, in the most crucial consideration, still 
'Although Plato discusses imitation in both Books III and X of the 
Republic, he specifically discusses painting in the Republic only in Book X. 
Since this paper's focus is Plato's views on pointing as voiced in the 
Republic, I have chosen to concentrate on those statements of Plato that 
bear directly on this topic. This happens to involve me in limiting my 
sights to portions of Book X. True, the curious difference of tone between 
Books III and X may seem necessary of heeding for worthwhile discussion 
of Plato's views on any form of imitation, including painting. However, the 
decision to slight consideration of Book III in this instance may seem 
pardonable if one considers that 1) Plato takes the harder line against 
imitation in Book X, and 2) I have tried to show how, by some consideration 
of historical context, this harder line may be read in a softer way, making it 
more compatible with Plato's ability to set forth the ideas that he did in 
Book 111. In this way,the efforts of this paper arc not impervious to, nor 
neglectful of, the difference in tone between the two books concerning 
imitation. 
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further removed from intellection of the forms or essences underlying the 
sensible realm (and thus, one might extrapolate, even further removed 
from the Good, source of all life, which is yet beyond the forms). Paintings 
are thus, as Plato says, "at a third generation from nature" (597e), "third 
from what is" (599a), "third from the truth" (602c). In other words, provided 
by Plato himself, the painter creates but mere phantoms of no more value 
than mirror images, for the painter not only draws upon no functional 
understanding of the objects he depicts, but consequently shows no 
understanding of the way in which each thing is good or bad. Having 
unequivocally asserted painting as imitation, Plato emphatically states: 
"the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning about what he imitates; 
imitation is a kind of play and not serious" (602b). But the ramifications d o 
not rest there, as Plato hastens to note. In not concerning themselves with 
the working of the objects they depict, painters do not use measuring, 
counting, or weighing as they relate to nature. As a result, painting is not 
the work of the calculating part of the soul. Rather, it appeals to "the part 
in us that is far from prudence, and is not comrade and friend for any 
healthy or true purpose" (603b). Thus, ironically, for Plato, painting is bad 
both because it is imitative and because it is not imitative enough to be the 
object it depicts. The upshot of Plato's discussion of painting is that 
painting is doomed to be superficial; it cannot rise to the level of abiding 
truth, let alone to the level of functional understanding. 
Even accepting Plato's position on the nature of truth and knowledge, 
there remain oversights in Plato's description of painting. For instance, 
and most obviously, Plato's assumptions ignore the possibil ity-that 
painting may not be limited to imitation of physical appearance. Plato 
docs not consider, nor seemingly even conceive, the possibility of non-
objective painting. Further, even if, by some stretching of the imagination 
and the facts, painting could only be seen to be limited to imitation of how 
things look, that still in no way means that painting is necessarily 
superficial, incapable of penetrating to and evoking deep insight. Such are 
the issues raised and defended by Collingwood and Kandinsky. Further 
discussion of these issues will be saved until presentation of the respective 
views of Collingwood and Kandinsky. 
Another point of contention which can be raised concerns Plato's 
comparison of painters to deceptive wizards (598d). Plato implies that 
painters and other imitators attempt to conceal through illusion that their 
works are three places removed from the truth. Granted, during Plato's 
time there lived and worked the virtuosic Greek painters, Zeuxis and 
Parrhasios. These two tried to outwit each other with trompe l'oeil 
painting: Zeuxis painted grapes that looked so real that birds came to 
peck at them. But when Parrhasios painted a tablecloth that deceived 
Zeuxis into trying to lift it, Parrhasios was agreed by both to have created 
the better illusion. For while Zeuxis had only fooled birds, Parrhasios had 
tricked another human being. Even this story, however, involves 
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consiousness of artistic fiction. As Sandstrom notes, the triumph of 
Parrhasios "came not of the deception itself but of its unmasking" 
(Sandstrom, p.16). Besides, such extreme cases of utmost illusionism as 
the goal are the exception rather than the rule throughout the history of 
art. As the art historian Leo Steinberg has noted, paintings typically call 
attention to their artifice, to the physical facts of the medium. As Steinberg 
puts it, "Old Masters always took pains to neutralize the effects of rea l i ty . . . 
. the more realistic the art of the Old Masters became, the more they 
raised internal safeguards against illusion, ensuring at every point that 
attention would remain forever focused on the art" (Steinberg, pp.40-41). 
They did this by such means as radical color economies, preternatural 
beauty, quotations and references to other art, abrupt internal changes of 
scale, and flat patterns as borders. True, such attention-calling to artifice 
may not have been typical of the painters of Plato's day, explaining Plato's 
quickness to conceive of painting in terms of imitation. But even with 
Creek illusionism, appreciation of the illusion involved recognition of the 
work as a painting, first and foremost. Further, regardless of the degree of 
illusionism sought in ancient Greek painting, not all painters have sought 
to fool the eye into believing their works to be "reality" rather than 
painting. Plato's indictment of painters as deceptive wizards is not 
universally applicable because it ignores the side of painting that seeks 
awareness of its medium. 
Other oversights in Plato's remarks on painting are detected by 
Collingwood, who critiques four assumptions at work in Plato's view of art: 
1) that art is a craft; 2) that art operates as a stimulus to evoke certain 
responses; 3) that some art is representative, and 4) that the nature of 
representation is imitation or literal rendering of surface detai l . 
Concerning the first point, Collingwood observes that Plato was operating 
out of the Greek notion that artists are but craftsmen (Collingwood, pp.5-6, 
17). Naming six significant reasons why art is not reducible to craft, 
Collingwood indicates how the confusion of art and craft leads to serious 
misunderstanding on Plato's part of what painting is and does, how it works 
on the viewer, and to what standards it should really be held if Plato 
believes that truth and goodness are achieved through proper functioning. 
The most pertinent of the points raised by Collingwood in terms of Plato's 
statements on painting has to do with means and ends (Collingwood, p.5). 
Collingwood notes that an artwork is not a means to a certain use by and 
satisfaction of the audience as a crafted object or tool would be. Nor is art 
a quantifiable tool for crafting certain emotional responses. To believe 
that it is, as Plato does, is to subscribe to what Collingwood calls the 
stimulus-and-reaction theory of art, which is but a subset of the mcans-
and-ends approach (Collingwood, pp.30-34). Art is not correctly read by 
those approaches because the effects of art arc not predictable in that 
way. Nor is the artwork indicated to be wrong or bad as a result. To 
Collingwood, this means that what makes something art is not a function 
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of moans, and that whatever means it does serve are fringe effects which 
are not direct, quantifiable, or consistent. Plato, however, insists on 
reading painting as a tool to certain ends, which he feels to be inevitably 
bad ones. Plato judges painting by its educational value and resultingly 
deems it derelict (600a, 605b) . In reading painting in those terms, 
Collingwood indicates, Plato misunderstands how painting really works, 
and where its essence and value truly lie. He thereby unduly condemns it, 
and throws the baby out with the bathwater. 
In like manner, Collingwood shows how Plato's way of associating 
representation with art contains a similar flaw. In attacking some poetry as 
representative, and seemingly all painting as so, Plato, says Collingwood, 
"was using the wrong means . . . . He did not apply the Socratic method 
with enough vigor; had he done so, he would have pulled himself up by the 
question, 'How can I discuss representative poetry before I have made up 
my mind what poetry is in itself?'" (Collingwood, p.49). Rather, says 
Collingwood, no art is representative. That is to say, "A representation may 
be a work of art; but what makes it a representation is one thing, what 
makes it a work of art another" (Col l ingwood, p.43) . Further, 
representation in painting is not limited to, does not solely involve, 
imitation of physical surface, as Plato seems to think. Different levels of 
representation are possible, including emotional representation achieved 
through select ive and seemingly symbol ic , though still l i teral , 
representation. Another level of emotional representation contains no 
literal imitation at all and is abstract, but still aims at capturing emotional 
qualities. Therefore, information deeper than surface facts is possible in 
painting, contrary to Plato's implications. Once again, by Collingwood's 
point of view, Plato mistakenly denigrates painting for qualities which arc 
not of its essence. 
Collingwood provides a way to see how painting may go beyond the 
superficial and indicates how the nature of painting is too elusive to be 
adequately judged by the reductive standards applicable to craft, judging 
painting as a craft, one misses the way in which painting really functions. 
On the other hand, one may not wish to go so far as Collingwood docs in 
dismissing as irrelevant the emotional and intellectual effects evoked by 
painting. Kandinsky's theory of the spiritual in painting provides for such 
an interest in painting as stimulus. Kandinsky shares with Collingwood a 
respect for painting, but unlike him places the value of painting in the 
effects it has on people (Kandinsky, pp.25-26, 45) . Kandinsky's further 
value in this context is that he has roughly similar attitudes toward truth, 
knowledge, and the soul as Plato, and yet at the same time he credits 
painting with more potential for contact with truth and the soul than docs 
Plato (Kandinsky, p.39). Kandinsky indicates a path for people who would 
wish to reconcile Plato's epistemology with a more beneficent regard of 
painting. 
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Kandinsky would agree with Plato that there are universal truths, that 
each thing has an abiding principle that is not of matter, and that people 
can penetrate beyond the physical to know the truth. Kandinsky would 
also agree with Plato that painting has an effect on the soul. But unlike 
Plato, Kandinsky believes that painting is one of the best means for 
penetrating to truth and providing knowledge of it to the soul (Kandinsky, 
p.29). True, painting concerned only with technique and the material 
realm will leave the soul hungry. But painting can tap into the spiritual 
kernel of things, and then it will lift the soul above and beyond the physical 
trappings to the inner spirit of nature (Kandinsky, pp. 25-26). It can do this 
through non-objective painting. That is, it can use the vibrations of pure 
color, form, and composition unfettered by represenation of material 
shells. Pure color and form can directly affect the soul to communicate the 
inner spirit of things (Kandinsky, pp.39, 40, 44, 47) . As Kandinsky says, 
"shades of c o l o r . . . awaken in the soul emotions too fine to be expressed in 
prose. . . . there will always be something left over which the word fails to 
express and which yet is not supererogatory but the very kernel of its 
existence" (Kandinsky, p.50). The artist knows the kernel and how to 
convey it through color and form due to inner necessity. Further, the 
vibrations of color and form are so certain, Kandinsky feels, that they can 
be expressed mathematically. He states, ' T h e final abstract expression of 
every art is number" (Kandinsky, p.73). Overall , like Plato, Kandinsky 
believes in absolutes; unlike Plato, Kandinsky believes painting can 
achieve them and that painting can be purely spiritual but never purely 
material. 
Kandinsky's theory goes against Plato's not only in positing non-
objective painting and its effects. It also goes against Plato's assessment of 
imitation and its effects. Kandinsky would disagree with Plato's view that 
representative or imitative painting is necessarily shallow. Rather, one 
type of imitation is a naive realism that escapes contrived or academic 
rules of formal beauty. This "great realism" penetrates through to and 
brings forth the content or inner spirit of the things depicted. Whether 
through the "great abstraction" or the "great realism," painting tan arrive 
at full spiritual content (Sclz, p. 125). 
If Kandinsky seems too mystical for comparison to Plato, at least the 
ancient Greek artists do not. Perhaps the clincher against Plato's stated 
attitude toward painting is that some of the ancient Greek artists had goals 
and achievements in line with Plato's high ideals. One of the best 
examples of "Platonic" art would be the work of the sculptor Polykleitos, 
who worked in the mid-fifth century B.C., shortly before Plato's birth. 
Polykleitos remained so famous that, a century later, "Aristotle used 
'sculptor' and 'Polykleitos' interchangeably" (Gardner, p.161). True, 
Polykleitos was a sculptor, not a painter. But if Plato railed against painting 
as too imitative and materialistic, sculpture could not have been seen but 
as even more inherently imitative and materialistic. Since sculpture broke 
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through such constraints to convey ideals, then the possibility of the same 
lor painting ought to have been seen by Plato. 
At any rate, Polykleitos is considered one of the best examples of the 
mid-fifth-century emphasis by Creek artists on proportion and rationality. 
Polykleitos worked according to a canon of proportions of his own devising 
which related the parts of the body to every other part. The extant Roman 
copy of Polykleitos' Doryphoros shows how he used proportion and 
complex, subtle organization to make his work conform to a preconceived 
ideal. It also shows these things: through his emphasis on proportion, 
Polykleitos is close to Plato's concern for proper measure. Through his 
emphasis on relations of proportions, i.e., ratios, i.e., rationality, Polykleitos 
is close to Plato's concern that rationality rule. In his use of an ideal form 
into which he fitted the human body, he is close to Plato's belief in 
universal, ideal forms to which all things adhere. 
Given that there were examples of artists who created rational, 
intellectual, idealistic, albeit material, forms, why was Plato so harsh on 
painting?- He seems to have been responding to a change in his culture 
and its arts. About the time of Plato's birth, Greece was passing its cultural 
zenith with the defeat of Athens by Sparta. At the same time, majestic, 
grand themes in sculpture were replaced by softer, more sensuous, 
images. Painting became increasingly given over to naturalism and 
illusionism, valuing those qualities to the exclusion of others. As Gardner 
says, in Greek art at this time, "majestic strength and rationalizing design 
arc replaced by sensuous languor and an order of beauty that appeals 
more to the eye than to the mind" (Gardner, p. 163). Collingwood openly 
connects this development with Plato's attitude toward art: "What Plato 
wanted to do . . . was to put the clock back and revert from the amusement 
art of the Greek decadence to the magical art of the archaic period and the 
fifth century. . . . Plato's discussion of poetry is rooted in a lively sense of 
realities: he knows the difference between the old art and the n e w - t h e 
kind of difference that there is between the Olympia pediments and 
Praxitcles-and he is trying to analyze it" (Collingwood, pp. 49 ,52) . 
Still, if Plato knew the difference between the old and the new art and 
wanted to return to the values of the old, why did he exhibit no tolerance 
for painting? Why did he allow that poetry could be either good or bad, 
non-representative or representative, but indicate that painting was only 
bad and imitative? Maybe he had no experience with Greek painting but 
what seemed trivial and decadent. But why did he not extrapolate from 
the "good" examples in sculpture to see good possibilities in painting? In 
all fairness to Plato, the answer may be that he was not treating painting as 
a separate topic for analysis in the Rqtublic. He brought in painting more 
as an off-handed way to elaborate his criticisms of imitative poetry. Civen 
what painters actually were doing at that time and place, and given how 
their paintings were probably typically read, Plato could casually refer to 
them to show what he meant by imitation and what he despised in it, and 
P L A T O : N O H O P E F O R P A I N T I N G ? 171 
be able to assume that people would know what he was talking about. If 
Plato had devoted a full, separate analysts to painting, surely his insightful 
and searching mind would not have maintained the indefensibly hard-
line description of painting in the Republic as a universal truth. Perhaps 
Plato's comments in the Republic were intended to be taken more as 
references to the state of painting as it was, rather than as final judgments 
on the incontrovertible nature of painting. 
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